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B A N K R U P T
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5377.
ISSUE
When a state court case is removed,
i.e., transferred, to federal court, is a
federal district court's subsequent
order remanding, i.e., returning, the
case to state court reviewable by a
federal appellate court?
FACTS
In March 1992, Anthony Petrarca
filed suit in Ohio state court against
Child World, Inc., alleging that Child
World had failed to pay rent under
two commercial lease agreements.
Petrarca also sought payment from
Cole National Corporation ("Cole")
because Cole allegedly guaranteed
the performance of Child World
under the leases. Things
Remembered entered the case as
successor, by merger, to Cole.
Some two months later, on May 6,
1992, Child World filed for
protection from its creditors under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Shortly thereafter, Child World
repudiated its lease obligations to
Petrarca, citing its bankruptcy.
On August 28, 1992, Petrarca filed
an amended complaint against
Things Remembered, alleging addi-
tional claims regarding five other
leases. The amended
complaint recited that Child World
had filed for bankruptcy.
Petrarca's action prompted Things
Remembered and Child World to
remove the case from state court to
federal court, either to district court
or to bankruptcy court. Accordingly,
on September 25, 1992, more than
30 days after Petrarca filed his initial
state court complaint and more than
90 days after Child World filed for
bankruptcy, Things Remembered
and Child World filed notices of
removal in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Ohio and in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. (As the name
suggests, a state case can be
removed, i.e., transferred from state
court to federal court, under certain
circumstances as when the case
raises issues of federal law.) The
notices of removal were based on
two federal statutes: the general
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1988), and the removal statute
dealing specifically with bankruptcy
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1452.
(Continued on Page 9)
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Anthony Petrarea sued
Things Remembered in
state court. Things
Remembered had the
case transferred to federal
district court, which sent
the case back to state
court after concluding
that Things Remembered
acted too late. The Sixth
Circuit refused to
entertain the appeal of
Things Remembered,
holding that it did not
have jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court is asked
to determine if the Sixth
Circuit was correct.
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Petrarca responded to the removal
effort on October 23, 1992, by filing
a motion to remand the case to
Ohio state court. In support of his
remand motion, Petrarca argued
that neither the district court nor
the bankruptcy court had jurisdic-
tion because Things Remembered
had not filed its removal notices
within the 30-day time period
provided under the general removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), or the
90-day time period applicable under
the bankruptcy removal statute,
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027(2).
Petrarca's challenge to Things
Remembered's removal efforts was
heard by the Ohio bankruptcy
court, which held the removal
timely under the 30-day limitations
period provided in the general
removal statute. According to the
bankruptcy court, the case did not
become removable under the gener-
al removal statute until Petrarca
filed his amended complaint which
mentioned the Child World bank-
ruptcy for the first time. That
mention conferred federal court
jurisdiction over the case under the
general removal statute if the notice
of removal was filed within 30 days
of the filing of Petrarca's amended
complaint, which it was.
The Ohio bankruptcy court went
on to hold that the notice of
removal filed under the bankruptcy
removal statute was not timely.
Here, the court noted that the
applicable 90-day limitations period
began to run when Child World filed
for bankruptcy in May 1992 and had
expired more than a month before
the bankruptcy-based removal
notice was filed. Things
Remembered did not appeal that
ruling to the district court.
Petrarca, however, appealed to fed-
eral district court, which held that
removal was untimely under both
removal provisions. Because
removal was untimely, the district
court held that neither it nor the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
over the case. Accordingly, the
district court remanded the case to
Ohio state court.
Things Remembered appealed to
the Sixth Circuit, which held that a
remand order, whether issued under
the general removal statute or the
bankruptcy removal statute, is
not reviewable on appeal. See 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) ("An order remand-
ing a case to the state court from
which it was removed is not review-
able on appeal or otherwise .... ");
28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) ("An order
entered under this subsection
remanding a claim or cause of
action ... is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise .... ").
It is this decision that the Supreme
Court reviews, having granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari filed
by Things Remembered. 115 S. Ct.
1821 (1995).
CASE ANALYSIS
There are two keys to understanding
this case. One key is the language
of the two removal statutes. The
second key, playing off of the first, is
which statute Things Remembered
really relied on in removing
Petrarca's state case to a federal
forum.
First things being first, it is neces-
sary to look to the language of the
two removal statutes. The general
removal statute reads: "An order
remanding a case to the state court
from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise"
unless the case involves equal pro-
tection claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
The bankruptcy removal statute
reads: "The court to which such
claim or cause of action is removed
may remand the claim or cause of
action on any equitable ground. An
order entered under this subsection
... is not reviewable by appeal or
otherwise. . . ." 28 U.S.C. 1452(b).
(Emphasis added.)
Turning to the second key to this
case - which removal provision
Things Remembered really used -
recall that Things Remembered filed
for removal under both the general
and the bankruptcy statutes. Before
the Supreme Court, however, Things
Remembered insists that it has pro-
ceeded all along under the bankrupt-
cy removal provision and that its
removal notice filed in district court,
while duplicative of the notice filed
in bankruptcy court, was filed out of
a lawyerly excess of caution.
Things Remembered proceeds to
argue that appeal is proper in this
case because the bankruptcy
removal section bars only appellate
review of equitable remand orders,
e.g., a remand order based on
general principles of fairness. Here,
Things Remembered stresses that
the order in this case was based on
jurisdictional grounds - untimely
filing - which is a legal, not equi-
table, ground supporting remand.
Petrarca counters that Things
Remembered principally relied on
the general removal statute, not the
bankruptcy statute. In support of
this argument, Petrarca references
the notice of removal filed in his
Ohio case by Things Remembered
and notes that the notice cites only
28 U.S.C. § 1446, the general
removal provision. Moreover,
Petrarca points out that Things
Remembered failed to appeal the
bankruptcy court's ruling that its
notice of removal was untimely
under the bankruptcy statute, a
failure indicating that Things
Remembered was not relying on
that provision.
That leaves only the general removal
statute, which does not contain any
language suggesting that only
Issue No. 1
remand orders based on equitable
grounds are unreviewable on appeal.
Petrarea contends that the plain lan-
guage of the general removal statute
prohibits appellate review of any and
all remand orders except remand
orders in cases raising equal protec-
tion claims, an exception obviously
not relevant in this case. Petrarea
concludes that the Sixth Circuit was
correct in applying the general
removal statute and in holding that
it did not have jurisdiction to review
the district court's remand order.
Petrarca has an alternative argument
in the event the Supreme Court
concludes that Things Remembered
really did proceed under the bank-
ruptcy removal provision. Here, he
points to the legislative history of the
provision and argues that Congress
was concerned with the inequity of
forcing a plaintiff with purely state
law claims from being forced to
litigate those claims in federal court.
Given Congress' understanding of
what constituted an equitable
ground when it enacted the bank-
ruptcy removal statute and assuming
that the statute applies here, appel-
late review is barred.
SIGNIFICANCE
Both Things Remembered and
Petrarca have authority to support
their respective views on the issues.
Things Remembered points to deci-
sions of the Third and Eleventh
Circuits, Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d
984 (3d Cir. 1984), In re National
Developers, Inc., 803 F.2d 616 (11th
Cir. 1986); Petrarca points to deci-
sions of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, Sykes v. Texas Air Corp.,
834 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1987);
Hernandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942
F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1991), in addi-
tion to the Sixth Circuit decision in
this case.
The Supreme Court's decision,
therefore, can be expected to resolve
this conflict. If the Court holds that
there is appellate review of district
court rulings remanding cases to
state court, there could be substan-
tial delays in litigating along with
increased costs as the parties appeal
decisions over where to litigate. On
the other hand, if the Court holds
that there is no appellate review, the
present level of inconsistent or con-
flicting decisions regarding when
remand orders are reviewable could
be headed for an increase.
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